基于福利经济学与一般均衡理论构建“五联动”模型,将集体租赁房的社会利益调整机理还原为土地和住房利益生产与分配的帕累托改进,推导集体租赁房最优供给量和最佳社会价值量的标准。进而设计政府、承租人、农村集体、利益集团多中心博弈竞合、协同治理机制。研究表明：集体租赁房存在正、负面效应和最优投入量区间{X₁~X₂},不能作为农地改革根本方向;集体租赁房生产和分配均衡的找寻将决定其性质偏重于商品房或保障房,以及在承租人和村集体利益群体间的分配;多中心治理机制应包含权力、资金—技术—管理和信息三个子框架;应赋予地方制度和技术选择的自主权。

Based on welfare economics and general equilibrium theory, this paper reconstructs the "Five Linkage" model to interpret the interest conflicts of collective land rental-housing into land and housing interest production and distribution Pareto improvement, deduces the optimal supply and the best social value standards, and designs the Multi-center competition-cooperation and synergy governance mechanism on the basis of government, lessee, rural collective and interest group. The research shows that the collective land rental housing has both positive and negative effects and optimal input range {X₁~X₂}, which can not be used as the fundamental direction of rural land reform. Collective land rental-housing value production and distribution balance will focus on the commodity housing or indemnificatory housing, and the distribution between leaseholder and the village landholder. Multi-center Governance mechanism should include three sub-frames of power, capital-technology-management and information, the autonomy of local policy choice should be relaxed.